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PATENTS AND THE PANDEMIC:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, SOCIAL CONTRACTS, AND ACCESS TO VACCINES
2021 Shidler Lecture
Peter Lee*
UC Davis School of Law
Through enormous public support and private initiative, biopharmaceutical
firms developed safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines in record time. These
remarkable vaccines represent humanity’s best chance to end the devastating
pandemic. However, difficult questions about ownership and access have arisen
alongside the development and deployment of these vaccines. Biopharmaceutical
companies have patented many of the technologies underlying these vaccines, thus
seeming to pit intellectual property rights against the objective of wide and rapid
dissemination of these critical resources. While prevailing debates have been
framed in the language of intellectual property, this Article suggests that contract
principles can help break the impasse and expand access to COVID-19 vaccines.
This Article explores the significant leverage that governments have in conditioning
public research support on increased access to patented vaccines and related
technical knowledge. It also questions whether biopharmaceutical firms have
upheld their end of the patent quid pro quo by adequately disclosing their
technologies in exchange for exclusive rights. Finally, it considers how changed
circumstances justify modifying the bargain that developed and developing
countries struck in strengthening global intellectual property standards. In a
variety of ways, governments can leverage public funding, quid pro quos, and
changed circumstances to increase access to patented vaccines, thus helping to
improve health and welfare on a massive scale.
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INTRODUCTION
For the past several years, the COVID-19 pandemic has completely
transformed our world. However, amid a devastating pandemic and incalculable
loss, medical research has offered some rays of hope. Through enormous private
initiative and public support, biopharmaceutical firms developed safe and effective
COVID-19 vaccines in record time. 1 Since their introduction in late 2020, billions
of people have received vaccinations against the novel coronavirus. 2 These
vaccines have saved countless lives, but due to their extraordinary ability to protect
public health, they have also engendered significant controversy over issues of
ownership, access, and distribution. While numerous factors have constrained
access to these vaccines, intellectual property rights have attracted significant
attention. This Article will examine the role of patents in inhibiting access to
COVID-19 vaccines and what we can do about it.
Before proceeding, it is useful to take stock of where we have been.
Developments have unfolded with breathtaking speed. In December 2019, the
World Health Organization (WHO) China Country Office received reports of a
mysterious pneumonia originating around Wuhan. 3 The disease quickly spread, and
on January 5, 2020, Chinese officials released the genetic sequence of what would
ultimately become known as the SARS-CoV-2 virus.4 On January 20, 2020, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed the first case of
COVID-19 in the United States. 5 On March 13, 2020, then-President Trump

1

See infra Part I.
Our World in Data, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations, https://ourworldindata.org/covidvaccinations (reporting that as of November 4, 2021, over 3 billion people had completed an initial
protocol for COVID-19 vaccination).
3
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC MUSEUM COVID-19 TIMELINE,
https://www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2022) [hereinafter CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TIMELINE].
4
Id.
5
Id.
2
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declared the COVID-19 outbreak a national emergency. 6 In late April 2020, the
White House launched Operation Warp Speed, an ambitious initiative aimed at
rapidly developing COVID-19 vaccines.7
Toward the end of 2020, we received some very encouraging news. On
December 11, 2020, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an
Emergency Use Authorization for the COVID-19 vaccine made by Pfizer and its
German partner, BioNTech. 8 A week later, the FDA granted Emergency Use
Authorization for Moderna’s COVID-19 vaccine.9 Massive vaccination drives
began, and the FDA granted Emergency Use Authorization for a third vaccine—
from Johnson & Johnson—on February 27, 2021.10 Due to vaccinations, some areas
of life in the United States began to return to normal. Of course, enormous
challenges continued, most notably in the form of new coronavirus variants. As of
November 2021, there were 46 million COVID-19 cases in the United States.11 193
million people in the United States, which corresponds to 58.1% of the country’s
population, had been fully vaccinated.12
While the rapid development of COVID-19 vaccines was an enormous
public health victory, challenges quickly emerged over issues of ownership, access,
and distribution. The domestic rollout of vaccinations has faced numerous
obstacles, particularly from difficulties of racial equity and vaccine hesitancy. 13
This Article, however, will focus on enormous disparities in access to COVID-19
vaccines on the global stage. Residents of wealthy and middle-income countries
received about ninety percent of the first 400 million doses of vaccines.14 As of late
September 2021, close to sixty percent (more than 700 million) of the 1.2 billion
6

Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) Outbreak, Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337 (March 13, 2020),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-nationalemergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/.
7
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TIMELINE, supra note 3.
8
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against COVID-19
By Issuing Emergency Use Authorization for First COVID-19 Vaccine (Dec. 11, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19 [hereinafter U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
First Covid-19 Vaccine].
9
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Additional Action in Fight Against COVID19 By Issuing Emergency Use Authorization for Second COVID-19 Vaccine (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-additional-action-fight-againstcovid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-second-covid [hereinafter U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., Second Covid-19 Vaccine].
10
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Emergency Use Authorization for Third
COVID-19 Vaccine (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fdaissues-emergency-use-authorization-third-covid-19-vaccine.
11
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, COVID DATA TRACKER, https://covid.cdc.gov/
covid-data-tracker/#datatracker-home.
12
Id.
13
See, e.g., Angela K. Shen, Richard Hughes IV, Erica DeWald, Sara Rosenbaum, Amy Pisani &
Walt Orenstein, Ensuring Equitable Access to COVID-19 Vaccines in the United States: Current
System Challenges and Opportunities, 40 HEALTH AFF. 62 (2021).
14
Selam Gebrekidan & Matt Apuzzo, Rich Countries Signed Away a Chance to Vaccinate the
World, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/21/world/vaccine-patentsus-eu.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2021).
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people living in the sixty-three high-income countries that have reported
vaccinations were fully vaccinated.15 By contrast, about one percent (9 million) of
the more than 650 million people living in the twenty-six lowest-income countries
with any reported vaccinations were fully vaccinated.16 Clearly, access to lifesaving
vaccines is grossly unequal around the world.
While numerous factors have contributed to stark disparities in vaccine
access, intellectual property rights have attracted significant attention. 17 The branch
of intellectual property most implicated is patents, which confer twenty years of
exclusive rights on novel, useful, and nonobvious technologies.18
Biopharmaceutical companies have been patenting the technologies underlying
COVID-19 vaccines for years—in most cases, based on work that long predated
the pandemic. This is the case, for instance, for novel mRNA vaccines, which
represent the most promising class of COVID-19 vaccines. A study of Englishlanguage U.S., European, and international patents and applications published from
January 2010 to April 2020 revealed that private companies own 80 of 113 mRNA
vaccine patent families.19 Among them, a handful of companies—Moderna,
BioNTech, CureVac, and GSK—collectively own nearly half.20
Patents on COVID-19 vaccines have engendered significant controversy.
On one side of the debate are those who argue that patents inhibit access to essential
vaccines and should be subject to significant limitations.21 According to this view,
wide access to vaccines is particularly justified given that the COVID-19 pandemic
represents an enormous public health crisis with literally billions of lives at stake.
On the other side of the debate are innovative biopharmaceutical companies that
developed COVID-19 vaccines. They assert that the rapidity with which private
patentees developed vaccines reflects the success of a property rights-based model
of technological development. 22 According to this view, weakening patent

15

Joe Murphy, Biden Wants to Address the Covid-19 Vaccination Disparity Between Rich and LowIncome Countries. Here’s How Wide It Actually Is, NBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2021),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/biden-wants-address-covid-19-vaccination-disparitybetween-rich-low-n1280050.
16
Id.
17
See, e.g., Achal Prabhala, Arjun Jayadev & Dean Baker, Want Vaccines Fast? Suspend
Intellectual Property Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
12/07/opinion/covid-vaccines-patents.html; Walden Bello, The West Has Been Hoarding More
Than Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/03/opinion/covidbiden-wto-vaccine.html; Matthew Kavanagh & Madhavi Sunder, Opinion: Poor Countries May Not
Be Vaccinated Until 2024. Here’s How to Prevent That, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2021, 5:01 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/10/dont-let-intellectual-property-rights-getway-global-vaccination/.
18
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 & 154.
19
Cecilia Martin & Drew Lowery, mRNA Vaccines: Intellectual Property Landscape, 19 NATURE
REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 578, 578 (2020).
20
Id.
21
See, e.g., Prabhala et al., supra note 17.
22
Christopher Rowland, Emily Rauhala & Miriam Berger, Drug Companies Defend Vaccine
Monopolies in Face of Global Outcry, WASH. POST. (Mar. 21, 2021), https://www.washington
post.com/business/2021/03/20/covid-vaccine-global-shortages/.
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protection would undermine incentives to invent, thus imperiling innovation both
in the present and for future pandemics.23
Amidst this difficult debate, this Article offers a path forward. Many
commentators have framed the controversy over access to patented vaccines in the
language of property, particularly intellectual property.24 However, this Article
argues for a conceptual shift. It suggests that contract principles can help break the
impasse and increase access to patented COVID-19 vaccines in a manner that
respects both public values and private ordering. In particular, this Article will
apply three concepts from contract law to reframe the debate over access to patented
COVID-19 vaccines. In doing so, it aims not for precise fidelity to contract doctrine
but to invoke contract principles to balance competing interests and craft solutions
to the challenge of vaccine access.
This Article examines the intersection of contract principles and access to
COVID-19 vaccines in three parts. Part I explores the concept of consideration,
which refers to the value provided by a party that can undergird a contractual
obligation.25 It contends that public entities have provided enormous consideration,
particularly in the form of research and development funding, to support the
creation of privately patented vaccines. This arrangement enables what I call a
“consideration-based” model of patent regulation. In this model, public institutions
can leverage massive contributions to privately patented vaccines to demand
greater access to those vaccines, particularly for low-income populations.
Part II examines the concept of a quid pro quo—a fundamental bargain or
exchange at the heart of a contract.26 Patent law is often characterized as a grand
societal quid pro quo in which inventors receive exclusive rights in exchange for
disclosing their inventions. This Part argues that holders of vaccine patents have
not disclosed tacit knowledge critical for manufacturing their vaccines, and it
questions the adequacy of the prevailing quid pro quo. Accordingly, it suggests
enhancing the disclosure obligations of patentability. Augmenting this approach,
this Part also explores how government agencies can leverage the quid pro quo of
public funding to increase technical disclosure by innovators—including
patentees—receiving public support. Doing so would remove an important obstacle
to widespread, parallel manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines around the world.
Part III turns to the doctrine of changed circumstances, which can excuse
nonperformance of a contract when conditions surrounding that contract change

23

See Mario Biagioli, Of Viruses and Licenses: Lessons from COVID-19 Vaccine Patent Debates,
L.A. REV. BOOKS (July 9, 2021), https://www.lareviewofbooks.org/article/the-tangled-web-ofviruses-and-licenses-lessons-from-covid-19-vaccine-patent-debates/
(“This
narrative
is
characterized by a discursive drift from results to potentials: from a traditional focus on patents as
direct incentives for achieving specific innovations in the present to seeing them, instead, as
providing the conditions of possibility for a vast pharmaceutical innovation ecology. . .”).
24
See, e.g., Prabhala et al., supra note 17; Rowland et al., supra note 22.
25
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 641-43 (1982)
(articulating an expansive conception of consideration in modern contract law that extends beyond
explicit bargains between two parties).
26
See generally Jed Lewinsohn, Paid on Both Sides: Quid Pro Quo Exchange and the Doctrine of
Consideration, 129 YALE L.J. 690 (2020) (examining and suggesting modifications to the role of
quid pro quos in contract doctrine).
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dramatically.27 It considers contracts writ large by examining the key international
agreement that governs global intellectual property obligations. In particular, it
focuses on the bargain that developed and developing countries struck when
concluding the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement). It also considers the recently adopted proposal to
temporarily waive certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, and it argues that
changed circumstances in the form of the devastating COVID-19 pandemic provide
a justification for doing so. Drawing from historical examples, it argues that altering
global intellectual property rules can facilitate greater access to lifesaving vaccines.
I.

PUBLIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVATELY PATENTED INNOVATION

Viewed from certain angles, the development of COVID-19 vaccines
represented a triumph of speed and private enterprise. Indeed, the rapidity of
vaccine development was truly unprecedented. In January 2020, researchers found
the viral sequence of SARS-CoV-2 roughly ten days after the first reported
pneumonia cases in Wuhan. 28 Less than ten weeks later, Moderna’s mRNA vaccine
candidate entered Phase 1 clinical trials.29 This is a remarkable pace given that
moving from sequencing a virus to Phase 1 clinical trials usually takes three to nine
years.30 Watching the news, the rapid drumbeat of progress was astonishing. In
early November 2020, Pfizer announced initial, promising data on its COVID-19
vaccine,31 and the FDA granted Emergency Use Authorization a month later. 32
Emergency Use Authorization for Moderna’s vaccine followed the next week.33
Innovative biopharmaceutical firms such as Pfizer, BioNTech, Moderna, and
Johnson & Johnson committed significant resources, navigated deep uncertainty,
and utilized cutting-edge science to develop vaccines in record time. 34
While the rapidity of vaccine development was truly impressive, this
achievement represented the culmination of research programs going back many
years. Moderna and BioNTech had been working on the mRNA platform
undergirding their COVID-19 vaccines long before the pandemic broke out. Along
27

See generally John Elofson, The Dilemma of Changed Circumstances in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis of the Foreseeability and Superior Risk Bearer Tests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 1 (1996) (examining the doctrine of changed circumstances in contract law).
28
Jocelyn Solis-Moreira, How Did We Develop a COVID-19 Vaccine So Quickly?, MEDICAL NEWS
TODAY (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/how-did-we-develop-acovid-19-vaccine-so-quickly.
29
Nicole Lurie, Melanie Saville, Richard Hatchett & Jane Halton, Developing Covid-19 Vaccines
at Pandemic Speed, 382 N. ENG. J. MED. 1969, 1971 (2020).
30
Penny M. Heaton, The Covid-19 Vaccine-Development Multiverse, 383 N. ENG. J. MED. 1986,
1987 (2020).
31
Katie Thomas, David Gelles & Carl Zimmer, Pfizer’s Early Data Shows Vaccine Is More Than
90% Effective, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/health/covidvaccine-pfizer.html.
32
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., First Covid-19 Vaccine, supra note 8.
33
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Second Covid-19 Vaccine, supra note 9.
34
See generally Sharon LaFraniere, Katie Thomas, Noah Weiland, David Gelles, Sheryl Gay
Stolberg & Denise Grady, Politics, Science and the Remarkable Race for a Coronavirus Vaccine,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/21/us/politics/coronavirusvaccine.html (detailing efforts to rapidly develop vaccines by Moderna and Pfizer).
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the way, they were patenting their technological advances. These firms were
following the common “race-to-patent R&D format” in the biopharmaceutical
industry, wherein firms aggressively seek intellectual property protection for their
discoveries to recoup high development costs and generate profits. 35 Indeed, the
fact that biopharmaceutical firms possess so many patents on COVID-19 vaccines
attests to the long-term nature of this research. Patent prosecution can easily take
over three years, and the vast majority of COVID-19 vaccine patents held by these
companies arose from research that long predated the pandemic.
Extending this theme, if we disaggregate the notion of invention itself, we
see that public support over several decades played a critical role in developing
today’s privately patented COVID-19 vaccines. As I will argue further below,
these massive public contributions to vaccine development provide governmental
entities with significant claims on these vaccines. In particular, these contributions
enable a “consideration-based” model of governance in which public entities can
demand greater access to patented vaccines, which arose in substantial part from
public funds, intellectual property, and other resources. In elucidating the
significant public contributions to COVID-19 vaccine development, I will focus
on the newest and most prominent class of vaccines: so-called mRNA vaccines,
which were developed by Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech. Furthermore, I will
focus on the “pre-history” of federal support for such vaccines before considering
the more recent history of federal support, primarily from Operation Warp Speed.
A. The “Pre-History” of Federal Support for Vaccine Development
Scientists have been studying coronaviruses for over half a century, and
much of that research has been publicly funded.36 Scientists have also been studying
vaccines for decades, and the recent success in developing COVID-19 vaccines
benefitted substantially from billions of dollars spent on HIV vaccine research since
2000.37 Focusing on the newest and most promising mRNA COVID-19 vaccines,
one commentator observes, “the path to mRNA vaccines drew on the work of
hundreds of researchers over more than 30 years.” 38 For example, since 2006,
Congress has appropriated hundreds of millions of dollars to the Biomedical
Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) to support the scientific
infrastructure underlying mRNA vaccines. 39 In 2012, the Defense Advanced

35

Ana Santos Rutschman, The COVID-19 Vaccine Race: Intellectual Property, Collaboration(s),
Nationalism and Misinformation, 64 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 167, 173 (2021).
36
Solis-Moreira, supra note 28; see also Richard G. Frank, Leslie Dach & Nicole Lurie, It Was the
Government That Produced COVID-19 Vaccine Success, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 14, 2021),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20210512.191448/#:~:text=It%20Was%20The
%20Government%20That%20Produced%20COVID%2D19%20Vaccine%20Success,-Richard%
20G.&text=The%20success%20of%20the%20US,the%20COVID%2D19%20vaccines%20themse
lves.
37
Jeffrey E. Harris, The Repeated Setbacks of HIV Vaccine Development Laid the Groundwork for
SARS-CoV-2 Vaccines (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper 28587, March 2021),
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35340773/.
38
Elie Dolgin, The Tangled History of mRNA Vaccines, 597 NATURE 318, 319 (2021).
39
Frank et al., supra note 36.
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Research Projects Agency (DARPA) started funding industry researchers
investigating RNA and drugs. One of the early grant recipients was Moderna. 40
Federally funded research was critical to developing the core technologies
that enable mRNA vaccines. Here, I will focus on just two. First, public funding
was crucial to developing genetically engineered spike proteins. The novel
coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, possesses a distinctive “spike” protein that plays a key
role in mRNA vaccine design. mRNA vaccines use the body’s machinery to create
similar spike proteins, which elicit an immune response and thus prime the immune
system to attack the coronavirus if and when it enters the body. 41 Decades before
the current pandemic, Dr. Barney Graham, who was then at Vanderbilt University,
conducted federally funded research on viral proteins.42 Graham later moved to the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), where he further refined his work on
bioengineered viral proteins, particularly the coronavirus spike protein. 43 Starting
in 2017, Graham’s NIH lab worked directly with Moderna on another coronavirus,
and the partnership intensified when the COVID-19 pandemic emerged.44
Moderna’s COVID-19 vaccine grew directly from its partnership with NIH.45 In
January 2020, within two days of China’s release of the genetic sequence for the
novel coronavirus, NIH and Moderna scientists had designed a vaccine. 46 Moderna
partnered with NIH to conduct mouse studies and began human trials within less
than ten weeks.47
Federally funded research was also critical to a second innovation
underlying mRNA vaccines: RNA modification, which allows bioengineered RNA
to slip past the body’s immune system. 48 Bioengineered RNA can perform highly
beneficial functions, but in its unmodified state, it represents an antigen that the
body’s immune system may try to destroy. 49 In the 1990s and early 2000s,
researchers Katalin Karikó and Drew Weissman from the University of
Pennsylvania received millions of dollars in NIH grants to explore RNA
preparations and uses.50 They discovered a process for modifying RNA that would
40

Dolgin, supra note 38, at 323.
Arthur Allen, For Billion-Dollar COVID Vaccines, Basic Government-Funded Science Laid the
Groundwork, SCI. AM. (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/for-billiondollar-covid-vaccines-basic-government-funded-science-laid-the-groundwork/; Stephanie Baker &
Cynthia Koons, Inside Operation Warp Speed’s $18 Billion Spring for a Vaccine, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-10-29/insideoperation-warp-speed-s-18-billion-sprint-for-a-vaccine.
42
Allen, supra note 41.
43
Gebrekidan & Apuzzo, supra note 14.
44
Allen, supra note 41; Rutschman, supra note 35, at 179; LaFraniere et al., supra note 34; Denise
Grady, Abby Goodnough & Noah Weiland, F.D.A. Approves Moderna’s COVID Vaccine, Adding
Millions of Doses to U.S. Supply, N.Y. TIMES (March 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
12/19/world/the-fda-approves-modernas-covid-vaccine-adding-millions-more-doses-to-the-ussupply.html.
45
Allen, supra note 41; LaFraniere et al., supra note 34; Grady et al., supra note 44.
46
Grady et al., supra note 44.
47
Dolgin, supra note 38, at 323.
48
Allen, supra note 41; Dolgin, supra note 38, at 321-22.
49
Allen, supra note 41.
50
LUIS GIL ABINADER, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, FOUNDATIONAL MRNA PATENTS ARE
SUBJECT TO THE BAYH–DOLE ACT PROVISION (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.keionline.org/34733.
41
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allow bioengineered DNA to evade immune system defenses. They filed several
patents covering RNA modification, and an analysis by Knowledge Ecology
International revealed that six of their patents acknowledge federal funding. 51 The
University of Pennsylvania exclusively licensed various patents and applications to
CellScript and its affiliate, mRNA RiboTherapeutics, in 2016.52 CellScript entered
into non-exclusive, worldwide sublicenses with Moderna and BioNTech in 2017. 53
Here again, crucial technology that undergirds mRNA COVID-19 vaccines arose
from federal funding.54
B. The Recent History of Federal Support for Vaccine Development:
Operation Warp Speed
While the federal government made enormous contributions over several
decades to the so-called “pre-history” of vaccine development, the government’s
most visible contributions came shortly after the outbreak of the pandemic. In April
2020, when the pandemic was only a few months old, the U.S. government
launched Operation Warp Speed. This initiative represented a partnership between
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of
Defense (DOD), and it had the ambitious goal of producing 300 million doses of
safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine.55 Operation Warp Speed pursued a portfolio
strategy in which it funded six companies utilizing three different vaccine “platform
technologies” to see which ones would be successful first.56 Massive public funding
played a crucial role in rapidly developing safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines,
including the novel mRNA vaccines produced by Moderna and Pfizer.
In a short period of time, Operation Warp Speed provided about $18 billion
in federal funding. Moderna received approximately $2.5 billion to develop,
manufacture, and sell its vaccine,57 a sum that covered all R&D expenses.58 This
funding included $53 million to expand its manufacturing capacity.59 Pfizer has
been quick to point out that it did not take any Operation Warp Speed money for
research and development. 60 However, Pfizer received an advance purchase
commitment of $1.95 billion for the sale of 100 million doses to the U.S.
51

Id.
Id. at 45; Allen supra note 41.
53
ABINADER, supra note 50; Dolgin, supra note 38, at 322.
54
Public support (not limited to contributions by the U.S. government) also undergirded the
development of other technologies at the heart of mRNA vaccines. One of these technologies is lipid
nanoparticles, which envelop modified mRNA and allow it to enter cells. Foundational research by
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government,61 and this commitment greatly mitigated the risk of vaccine
development.62 Additionally, while Pfizer did not take R&D money from Operation
Warp Speed, Pfizer’s German partner, BioNTech (which actually developed the
mRNA vaccine) received $455 million from the German government.63 It is thus
accurate to say that, directly and indirectly, Pfizer benefitted substantially from
public support for vaccine development. Johnson & Johnson received $1.5 billion
from Operation Warp Speed. Additionally, Sanofi and GSK, working jointly,
received $2 billion; Novavax received $1.6 billion; and AstraZeneca received $1.2
billion.64
Operation Warp Speed provided not just funding but critical logistical
support as well. For instance, as part of Operation Warp Speed, DOD and HHS
provided logistical help to increase Moderna’s manufacturing capacity. 65 The two
agencies utilized the Defense Production Act to prioritize eighteen supply contracts
for materials necessary to manufacture vaccines.66 Operation Warp Speed officials
even worked with the State Department to expedite visa approvals for key technical
personnel to work on vaccine development.67 Overall, Operation Warp Speed
played a critical role in the rapid creation of COVID-19 vaccines: “The government
essentially removed the bulk of traditional industry risks related to vaccine
development: a) scientific failures, b) failures to demonstrate safety and efficacy,
c) manufacturing risks; and d) market risks related to low demand.” 68 While private
enterprise and ingenuity were essential to vaccine development, such efforts may
not have achieved fruition, and certainly would not have done so in such a rapid
fashion, without massive public support.
C. A Consideration-Based Model for Enhancing Access to Patented
COVID-19 Vaccines
The federal government made enormous contributions to both the prehistory and recent development of privately patented COVID-19 vaccines. These
enormous contributions, moreover, provide the government with several levers to
enhance access to these essential technologies. In particular, they enable what I
have previously characterized as a “consideration-based” model of patent
regulation.69 Within this model, public institutions providing valuable
consideration (such as funding, labor, intellectual property, and other support)
contributing to the development of privately patented inventions obtain certain
61
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claims on those inventions. Within certain parameters, public institutions can
leverage such consideration to advance public policy objectives, such as enhancing
access to privately patented technologies. In the present context, massive public
support for privately patented COVID-19 vaccines provides several mechanisms to
demand greater access to these resources.
Notably, this is an essentially contractual model for enhancing access to
patented vaccines. Within this model, the federal government does not seek to
increase access to COVID-19 vaccines by changing the rules of patent law or
unliterally expropriating such technologies. 70 Rather, it operates as a market actor,
leveraging the enormous consideration it provides to downstream private entities
to require greater access to resulting technologies. In this sense, considerationbased approaches are less intrinsically coercive than unilateral state regulation. In
fact, the logic of consideration-based regulation reflects private ordering and should
appeal to some of the most vociferous proponents of strong property rights and
market-based technological development.
Enormous federal contributions to COVID-19 vaccines provide several
avenues to assert claims on these patented technologies. First, at the most basic
level, the federal government may actually own or co-own key intellectual property
undergirding COVID-19 vaccines.71 This is evident, for example, in federally
funded research on spike proteins.72 In 2017, Dr. Graham, who at the time worked
for NIH, and several colleagues utilized protein engineering to stabilize the spike
protein on a coronavirus before it fused with other cells. 73 NIH and its academic
partners patented this technology, which plays a core role in mRNA vaccines. 74
Notably, BioNTech and other companies have licensed this technology from NIH. 75
However, much to the chagrin of NIH, Moderna has not paid for a license. 76 The
need for vaccine developers to use this technology provides NIH with an
opportunity to license it with certain conditions attached, such as requiring
licensees to make COVID-19 vaccines widely available to certain low-income
populations. More specifically, the threat of a patent infringement suit against
Moderna would provide NIH with substantial leverage to demand significant
concessions from that firm, including commitments to make its vaccine more
widely available in the developing world.
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Apart from outright ownership of intellectual property, NIH recently
engaged in a dispute with Moderna over co-ownership of a key patent application.
The application covers the genetic sequence that prompts the mRNA vaccine to
produce an immune response.77 A July 2020 submission from Moderna lists its own
employees as inventors of the subject technology. 78 Moderna acknowledges that
NIH believes that three NIH scientists, including Dr. Graham, should be listed as
co-inventors on the patent application. However, Moderna’s submission states that
it has “reached the good-faith determination that these individuals did not co-invent
the mRNAs and mRNA compositions claimed in the present application.” 79 Despite
Moderna’s statement, NIH has a strong claim of co-ownership over this patent
application.80 Research agreements between NIH and Moderna indicate a
commitment to joint ownership of the results of that research. 81 In May 2020, NIH
Director Francis Collins stated that “we do have some particular stake in the
intellectual property” of Moderna’s vaccine candidate. 82 When NIH first
announced the interim results of the “NIH-Moderna COVID-19 Vaccine” in
November 2020, it noted that the vaccine candidate “was co-developed by . . .
Moderna, Inc., and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID) . . . .”83 An analysis by Public Citizen also strongly suggests that NIH has
an ownership stake in patents and patent applications covering Moderna’s
vaccine.84 The implications of this inventorship dispute are enormous. If the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) recognizes NIH scientists as co-inventors, then NIH,
as a co-owner of any resulting patent, would have unfettered ability to license the
technology to other parties without Moderna’s permission, thus greatly expanding
access.85 Moderna has recently decided to not make the payment that would allow
the contested patent application to issue, thus temporarily pausing the inventorship
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dispute with NIH.86 However, Moderna may still seek to obtain patent protection
on this subject matter at a later date.
Second, aside from any direct ownership stake in patents, the U.S.
government can exercise certain claims on privately patented technologies arising
from federal funds. These claims are statutorily enumerated in the Bayh–Dole Act,
a federal law that Congress enacted in 1980 to promote the commercialization of
patented technologies arising from federal funding.87 The Act allows recipients of
public funds, such as universities, to take title to patents arising from federally
funded research. Under the Act, if an academic researcher obtains an NIH grant
that supports developing a patented invention, the researcher or her university can
take title to that patent, even though a federal agency paid for it. The law was
enacted on the theory that allowing universities—rather than federal agencies—to
own patents would lead to greater licensing and commercialization of federally
funded technologies. In essence, the Act offers a valuable “double subsidy” to grant
recipients, who receive both taxpayer funds and patents on their research outputs.
However, in consideration for providing public funds and patent rights, the
federal government retains certain rights in inventions subject to the Act. 88 In this
sense, the Bayh–Dole Act reflects a consideration-based model of patent regulation.
For instance, while patentees have significant latitude in how they use and license
their patents, the federal government retains a “paid-up license to practice, or have
practiced” on its behalf, any invention falling under the Act.89 Furthermore, federal
agencies retain so-called “march-in rights” to issue compulsory licenses for subject
inventions if certain statutorily defined criteria are met. 90 Among them, a federal
agency can license a subject invention to a third party—without the permission of
a patentee—“to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied
by the contractor.”91 In principle, the Bayh–Dole Act provides NIH with the power
to exercise march-in rights on any patented inventions arising from at least partial
NIH funding. This would include federally funded, privately patented technologies
underlying COVID-19 vaccines.92 Although NIH has been highly reluctant to
exercise march-in rights,93 these rights represent another mechanism by which the
federal government could leverage massive research funding to increase access to
patented vaccines.
Third, simply as a matter of contract negotiations, enormous funding and
procurement of COVID-19 vaccines provides the federal government with leverage
to demand greater access to these essential technologies. Importantly, these
demands do not rely on any ownership stake in the underlying intellectual property
86
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or the technicalities of the Bayh–Dole Act. In Operation Warp Speed, the federal
government provided billions of dollars to six vaccine developers. Just as the
federal government negotiated over the price it would pay for vaccines, it could
have negotiated for commitments that vaccine developers make their vaccines
widely available at no or little profit in the developing world. This is a common
practice among funding entities. For instance, the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, which provides substantial funding for vaccine research, “includes
grant language requiring equitable access to vaccines. As leverage, the organization
retains some right to the intellectual property.” 94 Similarly, addressing the present
COVID-19 pandemic, the WHO has called on research funders to “[m]ake
appropriate provisions in funding agreements regarding accessibility and
affordability of resulting health products globally including through non-exclusive
voluntary licensing and other means to expand access by sharing know-how and
data.”95 Governments and nonprofits are contributing huge amounts of money to
accelerate vaccine development, and they can bargain for greater access to vaccines
in the developing world.
However, rich countries ignored calls by the WHO to include contract
language that would have guaranteed doses for poor countries or encouraged
companies to share patents. 96 According to public records, the U.S. government
“used unusual contracts that omitted its right to take over intellectual property or
influence the price and availability of vaccines. They did not let the government
compel companies to share their technology.” 97 Some Operation Warp Speed
contracts narrowed the window for the government to exercise march-in rights.98
Pfizer’s initial contract explicitly stated that the government had no march-in rights
at all.99 Other government bodies that funded COVID-19 vaccine development also
refrained from leveraging massive public investment to secure greater vaccine
access. “We funded the research, on both sides of the Atlantic,” said Udo Bullmann,
a German member of the European Parliament. “You could have agreed on a
paragraph that says ʻYou are obliged to give it to poor countries in a way that they
can afford it.’ Of course you could have.” 100 But they did not. However, the
94
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opportunity is not lost. Far beyond the frenzy of the opening months of the
pandemic, the United States and other governments are still negotiating to procure
hundreds of millions (and potentially billions) of vaccine doses. Each of these
contracts provides an opportunity for governments to utilize a consideration-based
model to enhance access to patented COVID-19 vaccines, particularly for those
with the least resources to obtain them.
Of course, a consideration-based model of patent regulation faces certain
risks and limitations. Aggressive assertion of ownership rights by federal agencies
and onerous strings attached to public money may chill private entities from
partnering with the government. This specter hangs over the recent dispute between
NIH and Moderna; while their collaboration has received praise as a model for
public-private partnerships, it may devolve into a bitter fight over patent ownership.
Concerns over antagonizing private partners and “interfering” in the market have
also prevented NIH from exercising march-in rights under the Bayh–Dole Act. Over
the past several decades NIH has received only five petitions to exercise march-in
rights, and it has denied all of them. These petitions have focused on patented
therapies, and NIH has articulated a very wide conception of what it means for a
patented therapy to be commercially available. Furthermore, NIH has expressed
deep apprehension over utilizing march-in rights to control drug prices.101 For a
brief period in the 1980s, NIH experimented with a “reasonable pricing clause” in
research collaborations with private drug companies. However, private firms
significantly opposed such controls, and NIH quickly dropped the provision. 102
Additionally, speed was paramount in the race to develop vaccines, and negotiating
greater access to vaccines could have consumed precious time.103 Dr. Moncef
Slaoui, the chief scientific advisor for Operation Warp Speed, has stated, “I can
guarantee you that the agreements with the companies [to enhance vaccine access]
would have been much more complex and taken a much longer time.” 104 For
instance, the European Union negotiated with biopharmaceutical companies over
price and liability provisions, which delayed vaccine deployment.105
While it is not without risks, leveraging enormous public investment to
enhance access to privately patented vaccines holds tremendous promise. Moderna,
Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and other biopharmaceutical companies deserve
8887bcf6 (citing a biotech industry executive for the proposition that governments should have
demanded more from the biopharmaceutical companies they were heavily funding).
101
See Lee, Distributive Commons, supra note 69, at 955-57 (profiling three instances in which NIH
declined to exercise march-in rights). If anything, proposed reforms to march-in rights seek to go in
the opposite direction by clarifying that federal agencies cannot use march-in rights “exclusively on
the basis of business decisions of a contractor regarding the pricing of commercial goods and
services arising from the practical application of the invention.” National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Rights to Federally Funded Inventions and Licensing of Government Owned
Inventions, 86 Fed. Reg. 35, 37 (Jan. 4, 2021). It bears noting that this constraint would not apply
to the proposal here, which is aimed at not simply reducing the prices of COVID-19 vaccines, but
also expanding manufacturing and supply.
102
Lee, Distributive Commons, supra note 69, at 974-75.
103
See Lupkin, Pfizer’s, supra note 99 (citing an HHS spokesperson who noted the need to obtain
doses “as quickly as possible” from Operation Warp Speed companies).
104
Gebrekidan & Apuzzo, supra note 14 (quoting Moncef Slaoui).
105
Gebrekidan & Apuzzo, supra note 14.

208

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol. 17:2

substantial credit for developing lifesaving vaccines in record time. However, if we
disaggregate the act of invention, we see that over the past several decades,
government agencies played a critical role in developing these vaccines.
Contributions of upstream money, labor, and intellectual property represent
valuable consideration that the federal government can use to assert claims on
downstream patented technologies. In some cases, the government may even own
or co-own key intellectual property. In other cases, when the U.S. government
contributes public funds to privately patented technologies, the government retains
certain statutorily enumerated rights over those inventions. Finally, simply as a
matter of contract negotiations, the government can leverage its status as an
enormous market participant to secure greater access to critical COVID-19
vaccines produced by its contractors. In this manner, public entities can utilize
private ordering to help ensure the wide availability of lifesaving vaccines.
II.

THE PATENT QUID PRO QUO AND TACIT KNOWLEDGE

Consideration-based regulation is one way in which contract principles can
enhance access to patented COVID-19 vaccines. However, while access to vaccines
is vitally important, so is access to the underlying technical knowledge necessary
to manufacture them. Such knowledge is critical to enabling mass, parallel vaccine
production by multiple parties, which can greatly amplify vaccine availability.
Vaccine developers, however, possess tacit technical knowledge critical to
manufacturing their products that they do not disclose in patents. Contract
principles can help unlock some of this patent-related tacit knowledge, as well as
other valuable knowledge.106
Of particular note, the contract principle of the quid pro quo can justify
greater technical disclosure from patentees of COVID-19 vaccines. Although
patents are a species of intellectual property, they are often characterized in contract
terms. Patents reflect a grand societal bargain between an inventor and the public
at large. According to this quid pro quo, inventors receive twenty years of exclusive
rights in exchange for disclosing a novel, useful, and nonobvious invention.107 For
centuries, patent lawyers and technologists have recognized that a critical benefit
of the patent system is not just the introduction of new technologies, but the
disclosure of new technical information by patentees.108 The collective disclosures
of patents represent an “invisible college of technology” that propels further
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advances.109 Extending the contract metaphor, this technical disclosure is the
consideration that inventors provide in exchange for exclusive rights.
The disclosure function of patents is well established in patent law. The U.S.
patent statute states that
the [patent] specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out
the invention.110
In pertinent part, the so-called enablement requirement mandates that a patent must
enable a person of ordinary skill in a technical art to make and use a patented
invention without undue experimentation. 111 The patent system is designed so that
a technical artisan in a field should be able to read a patent, such as for a technology
related to COVID-19 vaccines, and understand how to make and use that invention.
In essence, the patent “codifies” an invention, translating knowledge from the
inventor’s mind into a text that other technical artisans can readily absorb. 112
A. Tacit Knowledge
While critically important, patent disclosure is limited in many ways. 113
This Part focuses on one of these limitations, namely the inability of patents to
disclose tacit knowledge. As scientist and philosopher Michael Polanyi famously
observed, “We can know more than we can tell.”114 Polanyi was describing tacit
knowledge—personal, experiential knowledge that is not amenable to codification.
For example, a world-class chef may be able to write a detailed recipe for beef
Wellington, but I can assure you that even if I follow that recipe very closely, the
chef’s dish will taste much better than mine. 115 Much of cooking, as with other
fields requiring technical information and skill, involves tacit, personal knowledge
residing in the minds of practitioners. Such knowledge is borne of unique personal
109
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experience, observation, and even muscle memory. In the context of patented
technologies, tacit knowledge encompasses invention-related knowledge that
resides in the minds of inventors. It represents “intangible knowledge, such as rules
of thumb, heuristics, and other ‘tricks of the trade.’”116 Such knowledge is not
amenable to codification, and it is not disclosed in a patent or any other type of
document.
In introducing tacit knowledge, it is important to draw several distinctions.
First, tacitness is a question of degree. At one end of the spectrum is knowledge
that is technically codifiable though presently uncodified, which is referred to as
latent knowledge.117 At the other end of the spectrum is purely tacit knowledge that
is not capable of codification. 118 Second, it is useful to distinguish between tacit
knowledge that is helpful for practicing some basic version of an invention and tacit
knowledge that is helpful for commercializing an invention in an industrial context.
For example, an inventor’s tacit knowledge may be useful for creating one dose of
a patented vaccine in a controlled laboratory environment. However, the inventor’s
tacit knowledge may be particularly useful for ramping up production of hundreds
of millions of doses of a patented vaccine. 119
The importance of tacit knowledge to practicing patented inventions casts
new light on the adequacy of the patent quid pro quo. In theory, technical disclosure
by patentees provides the consideration that justifies the grant of exclusive rights.
Biopharmaceutical companies asserting patents on COVID-19 vaccines implicitly
maintain that they have upheld their end of the bargain. They have adequately
disclosed their inventions, and as such, they should receive twenty years of
exclusive rights. Recently, there has been reason to question whether the prevailing
quid pro quo strikes the right balance. And a significant reason for doubt, somewhat
ironically, has come from biopharmaceutical patentees themselves.
In October 2020, India and South Africa proposed a temporary waiver of
global intellectual property rules under the TRIPS Agreement for all technologies
related to diagnosing, preventing, and treating COVID-19.120 In June 2022, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted a limited waiver focused on patented
COVID-19 vaccines.121 I address the waiver at greater length below, 122 but for
present purposes, it temporarily suspends the obligation of member states to
116
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observe certain minimum requirements for patent protection as enumerated in a
binding international agreement.
When India and South Africa proposed the TRIPS waiver in 2020,
biopharmaceutical companies immediately opposed it. Unsurprisingly, they argued
that it would expropriate valuable intellectual property rights and undermine
incentives to invent.123 They further argued that such a waiver would be not only
unfair but also ineffective. Specifically, biopharmaceutical patentees argued that
waiving intellectual property rights would do little to ramp up manufacturing and
distribution of COVID-19 vaccines because, among other constraints,124 third
parties lack critical tacit knowledge for manufacturing vaccines in industrial
quantities. Put differently, even if governments did not enforce patents, the absence
of tacit knowledge would prevent third-party manufacturers from effectively
producing billions of doses of generic COVID-19 vaccines.125
Tacit knowledge is particularly critical to the industrial production of novel
mRNA vaccines. It has been long recognized that ramping up production of
biologic products in industrial quantities often requires significant tacit knowledge
from the original inventor. 126 Commentators argue that for “complex COVID-19
vaccines and biological therapeutics, fast manufacturing, particularly of products
originally developed by other firms, will require not only physical capacity but also
access to knowledge not contained in patents or in other public disclosures.” 127 In
similar fashion, Alain Alsalhani, a vaccine expert from Doctors Without Borders,
observed, “You need someone to share the process, because it’s a new technology
. . . . One of the problems we have is that the scientific literature about industrialscale manufacturing of mRNA vaccines is so slim. This is why it’s not just about a
recipe, it’s about an active and full tech transfer.”128 Accordingly, third-party firms
need to obtain tacit knowledge from originator firms in order to manufacture
patented COVID-19 vaccines.129
Moderna seized on the importance of tacit knowledge in vaccine
manufacturing to argue against the TRIPS waiver. The company has several patents
covering components of COVID-19 vaccines. But Moderna has famously pledged
to not assert these patents against any entities making COVID-19 vaccines during
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Eric Martin & Susan Decker, U.S. Weighs Global Vaccine-Expansion Move Opposed by
Drugmakers, BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (Apr. 22, 2021); Rowland et al., supra note 22.
124
Other factors include shortages of manufacturing capacity and raw materials at various sites
around the world. Martin & Decker, supra note 123.
125
Ian Lopez, Vaccine IP Enforcement Takes Stage in Global Immunization Fight, BLOOMBERG
LAW NEWS (Apr. 27, 2021).
126
Cf. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and
Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023 (2016) (discussing the difficulty of replicating large-molecule
biologic drugs).
127
W. Nicholson Price II, Arti K. Rai & Timo Minssen, Knowledge Transfer for Large-scale
Vaccine Manufacturing, 369 SCIENCE 912, 912 (2020).
128
Stephanie Nolen & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pressure Grows on U.S. Companies to Share Covid
Vaccine Technology, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2021) (quoting Alain Alsalhani, Doctors without
Borders).
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Price II et al, supra note 127, at 912.
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the pandemic.130 As such, Moderna can argue that its patents are not preventing
generic production of its mRNA vaccine. However, it vociferously opposed the
TRIPS waiver. In so doing, Moderna argued that other constraints would render
such a waiver ineffectual. In particular, it contended that third-party manufacturers
lack the technical capacity, including knowledge and specialized equipment, to
produce their vaccine in industrial quantities.131 Tellingly, Moderna has refused to
widely share its tacit knowledge related to vaccine manufacture. 132
Contrary to Moderna’s claim, however, vaccine manufacturers around the
world possess sophisticated equipment and are ready to manufacture vaccines—if
they only had the blueprints and technical know-how from vaccine developers like
Moderna.133 According to Suhaib Siddiqi, former director of chemistry at Moderna,
with the appropriate blueprint and technical advice, a modern vaccine manufacture
should be able to begin producing vaccines in at most three to four months. 134
Beyond patent rights, a key missing ingredient is tacit knowledge from vaccine
developers.
The inability of third parties to practice technologies that inventors have
ostensibly disclosed in patents raises serious questions about the sufficiency of the
patent quid pro quo. I am not necessarily suggesting that Moderna, BioNTech, and
other vaccine patentees have not satisfied the existing disclosure requirements of
patent law, although others have made that claim. I am suggesting, however, that
the disclosure obligations placed on patentees—which form an essential part of the
patent quid pro quo—are too low. Where patentees retain significant technical
knowledge as tacit and undisclosed, and where persons of ordinary skill are at a
significant informational disadvantage relative to patentees in practically making
and using inventions, there is good reason to doubt the adequacy of the patent quid
pro quo.
B. Modifying the Patent Quid Pro Quo
So, what can be done? One set of interventions involves increasing the
general disclosure requirements of patent law as a condition for obtaining exclusive
rights. This approach would orient the disclosure requirement more toward the
“downstream,” practical application of patented technologies. In general, these
interventions would facilitate greater disclosure of relatively low-hanging fruit:
latent knowledge that is presently uncodified but codifiable. This Article proposes
several reforms in this regard.
First, this Article suggests rehabilitating the best mode requirement. U.S.
patent law presently requires that inventors disclose any known “best mode” for
practicing their invention. 135 The best mode requirement goes beyond mere
130

Moderna, Statement by Moderna on Intellectual Property Matters during the COVID-19
Pandemic (Oct. 8, 2020).
131
Gebrekidan & Apuzzo, supra note 14 (quoting Moderna’s chief executive, Stephane Bancel).
132
See Nolen & Stolberg, supra note 128 (detailing the Biden administration’s frustration with
Moderna for not transferring its technology widely to other vaccine manufacturers).
133
Cheng & Hinnant, supra note 100.
134
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135
35 U.S.C. § 112.
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enablement: if a patent applicant “develops specific instrumentalities or techniques
which are recognized by the applicant at the time of filing as the best way of
carrying out the invention, then the best mode requirement imposes an obligation
to disclose that information to the public as well.” 136 Thus, for example, if a vaccine
inventor knew of the best way of manufacturing a vaccine when filing a patent
application, the best mode requirement would require disclosing such information
in the patent. While disclosing a best mode is still technically a requirement of
patentability, recent patent reforms have rendered it toothless; unlike all other
requirements of patentability, challengers cannot invalidate a patent based on
failure to comply with the best mode requirement, and patent authorities rarely
enforce it.137 This Article suggests rehabilitating the best mode requirement to its
prior status. Requiring patentees to disclose any known best mode for practicing
their inventions would lead to greater codification of valuable tacit knowledge. It
would further eliminate a troubling paradox—reflected by the controversy over
access to patented vaccines—in which a patentee ostensibly “discloses” a
technology in a patent, yet it retains crucial knowledge about that invention as a
trade secret.138
Second, this Article joins others in arguing for a more dynamic patent
disclosure requirement. Presently, the enablement requirement only applies to a
basic version of a claimed invention. Courts have long held that patents need not
provide production specifications for a commercial product.139 Consistent with this
orientation, disclosure is largely fixed at the time of filing a patent application.
Indeed, a patent applicant has an incentive not to amend the disclosure during patent
prosecution because doing so may lead to losing an earlier (and more desirable)
priority date. However, as law professor Jeanne Fromer notes, much valuable
information about an invention, particularly relating to commercialization, arises
after patent filing.140 Fromer has argued for a doctrine of “dynamic patent
disclosure” that requires patentees to disclose information about a patented
invention, particularly regarding commercialization, as a condition of maintaining
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Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (eliminating the failure to disclose a best mode as a ground for
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and complexity of litigation. See Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets,
15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 8-9 (2012). Accordingly, in 2011 Congress eliminated the failure to comply
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In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962); CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d
1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Title 35 does not require that a patent disclosure enable one of
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patent rights.141 She advances a modest proposal requiring patentees to identify
known commercialized products produced by the patentees and their licensees that
fall within their patent claims.142 This Article extends this principle and argues for
a more robust obligation of dynamic disclosure. It proposes that patentees must
disclose relevant technical information related to practicing their patented
inventions (including any known or updated best mode) in order to maintain patent
rights. Such an ongoing obligation would persist for a reasonable time, say five
years, from the date of filing. Failure to provide such dynamic disclosure would
lead to patent invalidation. This requirement would provide a lever by which the
patent system could, for example, compel vaccine patentees to disclose details
about how to commercially manufacture their vaccines, even after the date of patent
filing.
Third, this Article suggests a more concrete proposal for ongoing patent
disclosure for a class of patented technologies that includes vaccines. The foregoing
proposal for dynamic patent disclosure is subject to obvious monitoring and
enforcement challenges. After all, five years after a patent issues, how would the
PTO know that a patentee possessed tacit knowledge related to manufacturing that
it should disclose? In some instances, however, we do know that such information
exists because the patentee discloses it elsewhere. As a condition for obtaining
regulatory approval for a diagnostic, therapeutic, or prophylactic—such as a
vaccine—biopharmaceutical companies must submit significant information to
regulatory agencies such as the FDA. Regulators want to know how health products
are manufactured, and “regulatory approval typically requires the extensive
codification of tacit manufacturing knowledge.” 143 For instance, the FDA examined
Moderna’s production facilities and clinical trial sites before approving its COVID19 vaccine.144 Existing law prevents the FDA from easily disclosing this
information.145 However, this Article suggests requiring patentees to disclose such
discrete, codified knowledge—which they already submit to a regulatory agency—
as a condition of maintaining patent rights. A heightened, ongoing disclosure
requirement would lead patentees to share valuable knowledge—in this case,
codified trade secrets rather than uncodified tacit knowledge—for commercializing
their inventions.
C. Beyond the Patent Quid Pro Quo

141

Id. at 1722.
Id.
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Price II et al., supra note 127, at 913.
144
Grady et al., supra note 44.
145
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding that unauthorized disclosure of trade
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expectation of nondisclosure, is subject to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment); 21 U.S.C.
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see Christopher J. Morten & Amy Kapczynski, The Big Data Regulator Rebooted: Why and How
the FDA Can and Should Disclose Confidential Data on Prescription Drugs and Vaccines, 109
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Augmenting this proposal, this Article suggests leveraging additional
public-private quid pro quos to induce greater technical disclosure by innovators—
including patentees—receiving public funds. Such measures may be necessary to
unlock purely tacit knowledge. Several of the foregoing proposals would compel
patentees to disclose latent knowledge—that which is uncodified but codifiable.
However, purely tacit knowledge is not amenable to codification, and attempts to
codify it may be highly costly and inefficient. Rather than codification, transferring
purely tacit knowledge often requires direct interpersonal interaction between
possessors and adopters of such knowledge.146 For instance, I could spend days
reading instructional manuals on how to serve a tennis ball, but I would progress
much faster by working directly with a tennis coach who could impart tacit
knowledge through interpersonal instruction. In the technological context,
transferring purely tacit knowledge often requires direct personal and
organizational linkages between inventors and technology adopters. This is evident,
for instance, in university-industry technology transfer. As I have described in other
work, companies licensing university patents routinely hire academic inventors as
consultants to help transfer and commercialize patented inventions.147 While in
theory the licensee should be able to read the patent and understand how to make
and use a technology, there is often no substitute for talking directly with an
inventor herself to understand an invention.
The importance of personal communications to transferring inventionrelated tacit knowledge raises several possibilities to improve such transfer. One
proposal would be to require patentees to commit to working with technology
adopters to transfer tacit knowledge and assist with commercializing patented
technologies. Such an obligation could range from providing additional codified
disclosure to licensees to negotiating in good faith for consulting services with
technology adopters. While Congress could engraft such an obligation onto the
patent quid pro quo, this Article ultimately argues against such a proposal. An
obligation for patentees to directly work with individual licensees would be much
more burdensome than simply heightening general disclosure requirements. It
would require patentees to redirect key personnel from important projects, and it
would be particularly onerous in the context of compulsory licenses, where a
patentee would have to share tacit knowledge with third parties against its will.148
More generally, it would be very difficult for government authorities to monitor
and enforce the sufficiency of compulsory tacit knowledge transfer. Ultimately,
forcing patentees to engage in direct tacit knowledge transfer as a condition of
maintaining a patent is a bridge too far.
The calculus may be different, however, for innovators—including
patentees—receiving substantial public funding. Returning to a previous theme,
this Article proposes a “consideration-based” form of regulation to help unlock tacit
146
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knowledge where federal funds helped to develop a novel technology. For example,
government agencies funding research leading to vaccines could require that
funding recipients not only make products widely available but also transfer tacit
knowledge to select manufacturers to facilitate mass production.149 This could be
accomplished, for instance, by contractually mandating that funding recipients
participate in knowledge-sharing “hubs,” such as the WHO’s COVID-19
Technology Access Pool (C-TAP).150 C-TAP represents a potentially powerful
resource for sharing tacit knowledge for manufacturing COVID-19 vaccines. To
date, however, vaccine developers (which have received significant public funds)
have not agreed to share their patents or know-how with C-TAP or similar
entities.151 However, public entities could require recipients of public funds to
commit to transferring tacit knowledge to knowledge hubs or designated licensees
on reasonable terms.
An obligation for public funding recipients to directly provide tacit
knowledge would run into familiar objections regarding manpower shortages.
Indeed, Pfizer and Moderna have both argued that personnel knowledgeable about
mRNA vaccine production are in such scarce supply that they cannot send them to
other sites around the world.152 It bears mentioning that under this proposal,
publicly funded innovators sharing tacit knowledge would be able to charge a
reasonable royalty,153 which would mitigate to some extent their personnel and
financial burdens. However, to heighten the incentive and address resource
constraints, public entities may have to provide financial and other support to
enable private entities to share tacit knowledge with others. This seems eminently
feasible in the current pandemic; after all, Operation Warp Speed provided
Moderna with not only funds but also help in obtaining personnel to ramp up
vaccine development.154
As a general matter, the receipt of substantial public funds opens significant
avenues to compel vaccine developers to disclose valuable technical knowledge.
This applies to not only tacit knowledge but also codified knowledge currently
Price II et al., supra note 127, at 914 (“[A] government commitment could usefully require
transfer of manufacturing know-how across firms with which it has contracted.”); id. (“[T]he EU
might well be suited to using the lure of funding to nudge firms toward knowledge transfer.”);
Matthew M. Kavanagh, Lawrence O. Gostin & Madhavi Sunder, Sharing Technology and Vaccine
Doses to Address Global Vaccine Inequity and End the COVID-19 Pandemic, 326 JAMA 219, 220
(2021) (“The Biden administration has leverage to incentivize sharing, given extensive public
funding.”).
150
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 95.
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Ed Silverman, Pharma Leaders Shoot Down WHO Voluntary Pool for Patent Rights on Covid19 Products, STAT: PHARMALOT (May 28, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/
05/28/who-voluntary-pool-patents-pfizer/.
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Nolen & Stolberg, supra note 128. Manufacturing techniques can be so complex and tacit that
even vaccine developers do not understand them, relying instead on the expertise of contract vaccine
manufacturers. See Cynthia Koons & Susan Decker, Inovio Tells Court Supplier Is Holding Covid
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executive director of the Medicines Patent Pool).
154
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 55, at 28.
149

2022]

PATENTS AND THE PANDEMIC

217

maintained as trade secrets. By default, the government retains broad rights to data
arising from government contracts. The Federal Acquisition Regulations define
data broadly to include “recorded information, regardless of the form or the media
on which it may be recorded,” including “technical data.”155 In the context of
Operation Warp Speed contracts for COVID-19 vaccines, such data include cell
lines, studies, and manufacturing know-how.156 As a statutory default, the
government would have broad rights to technical knowledge that is vital to COVID19 vaccine manufacturing. However, companies participating in Operation Warp
Speed successfully negotiated around this default, retaining proprietary rights to
such data.157 Relatedly, the White House has said that it does not believe the federal
government has the authority to compel Moderna and other vaccine manufacturers
to transfer tacit knowledge. 158 However, an analysis by Public Citizen concludes
that the federal government retains unlimited rights in Moderna’s data arising from
government contracts, including data related to commercial manufacturing. 159
Furthermore, the federal government “would seem free to share the commercialscale up vaccine recipe” with other parties. 160 Continuing the theme of quid pro
quos, significant government support leading to patented vaccines provides
leverage for the government to demand greater accessibility to not only vaccine
doses themselves, but also the technical knowledge necessary to manufacture them.
III.

CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW

While this Article has focused on domestic mechanisms to enhance global
access to COVID-19 vaccines, this Part turns more centrally to the international
legal landscape. It focuses on the TRIPS Agreement, an important multilateral
intellectual property agreement established in connection with the formation of the
WTO. In this context, this Article suggests that another contract principle, the
doctrine of changed circumstances, can help justify modifying this international
agreement in light of the drastic exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic. In general,
the doctrine of changed circumstances excuses nonperformance of a contract when
155
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the conditions surrounding the original bargain have changed in substantial and
unforeseeable ways.161 The principle of changed circumstances has a long history
in domestic law, and it even finds recognition in international law and the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.162 To be sure, there are complications to
applying this domestic-law concept to international treaties, and this Article does
not suggest direct application of the doctrine.163 Nonetheless, the principle of
changed circumstances provides a conceptual basis for modifying international
intellectual property agreements in light of an unprecedented pandemic.
A. Contract Metaphors in the Formation of International Intellectual
Property Law
Though international patent law is well-developed today, substantive
international harmonization of patent law is relatively recent. Historically, patent
law was largely a domestic affair wherein states could craft their patent laws to suit
their particular interests.164 For example, up until several decades ago, over forty
low- and middle-income countries, including Brazil and India, did not grant product
patents on pharmaceuticals. 165 In many ways, this was sound policy. Most
developing countries did not have innovative domestic biopharmaceutical
industries that demanded patent protection for their products. Furthermore, the
absence of patents on foreign medicines helped lower the cost and increase access
to these resources for low-income populations. Finally, the absence of patent
See, e.g., U.C.C., Art. 2-615 (relieving a seller of liability “if performance has been made
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made . . . .”); see generally John D. Wladis, Impracticality
as Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed Circumstances upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of
Goods, 22 GA. L. REV. 503, 503-04 (1988). One variant of the changed circumstances principle is
the rule of impossibility, which discharges the contractual obligations of a party if supervening
events prevent it from fulfilling its part of the contract. See Uri Benoliel, The Impossibility Doctrine
in Commercial Contracts: An Empirical Analysis, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 393 (2020).
162
See Detlev F. Vagts, Rebus Revisited: Changed Circumstances in Treaty Law, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANS. L. 459, 464, 470-71 (2005); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 62, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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frustration to international law). Among other considerations, domestic parties invoking the changed
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not be available in the international context. Additionally, treaties tend to be subject to more
prolonged deliberation than ordinary contracts. Finally, potential application of the changed
circumstances doctrine is complicated in the context of multilateral treaties involving multiple
parties as opposed to the binary agreements typical of contracts. Vagts, supra note 162, at 465.
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protection prevented regressive wealth transfers from poor countries to wealthy
multinational corporations in the form of patent royalties.
This landscape shifted dramatically toward the end of the last century. In
the mid-1990s, after decades of negotiations, countries around the world
established the WTO, an international organization devoted to promoting free trade
and reducing tariffs and protectionist trade policies. As part of establishing the
WTO, member states also concluded the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).166 The TRIPS Agreement
established minimum substantive standards for protecting patents, copyrights,
trademarks, and other forms of intellectual property. Adopting the TRIPS
Agreement was a requirement to join the WTO, though concessions were made to
allow various categories of developing countries to delay fully implementing
TRIPS.167 While international patent law has existed for well over a century, the
TRIPS Agreement represented an unprecedented step in displacing individual state
sovereignty and substantively harmonizing (and strengthening) patent standards
around the world.
Contract metaphors pervade the formation of the WTO and the TRIPS
Agreement. In general, a multilateral treaty is a grand social contract among
countries. States agree to give up some element of control to achieve gains from
international cooperation. In a more direct sense, the WTO and the TRIPS
Agreement represented a broad bargain between developed and developing
countries. Developing countries received greater access to developed-country
markets for agriculture, textiles, and other exports and a seat at the table when
making global trade rules.168 For their part, developed countries gained increased
IP protection in developing countries, which had historically been hotbeds of
piracy. Such “linkage bargaining,” which tied greater market access to stronger IP
standards, helped convince developing countries to join the WTO, even though it
meant strengthening substantive IP standards more than they would have
preferred.169
Developed countries presented TRIPS to developing countries as a bargain
worth taking.170 On the one hand, developing countries would face some immediate
welfare losses from strengthening intellectual property standards. For example,
prices for pharmaceuticals, movies, and other IP-protected goods would increase,
and individuals employed by piracy-based industries would face dislocation. On
166
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the other hand, developing countries hoped that strengthening intellectual property
protection would lead to long-term gains from stimulating local innovation and
increasing technology transfer from wealthier nations.171 In theory, companies from
developed countries would be more likely to invest directly in, and transfer
technology to, developing countries with strong IP standards.172 Furthermore,
TRIPS requires developed countries to provide incentives for technology transfer
to least-developed countries.173 Whether or not this bargain has actually paid off
for developing countries is a matter of intense debate. 174 Many observers view
TRIPS as a one-sided bargain that heavily favored the interests of developed
countries.175
As a result of this grand bargain, developing countries signed on to TRIPS
and had to strengthen IP protections in several ways. Among other reforms,
member states extended patentable subject matter to a wide range of inventions,
including pharmaceuticals.176 Additionally, TRIPS imposed regulations on
countries’ ability to issue compulsory licenses. TRIPS still permits countries to
issue compulsory licenses, but it imposes procedural and substantive regulations
that, in effect, make it harder for them to do so.177 Unlike other international
agreements, TRIPS obligations have real bite in that they are enforceable through
the WTO dispute settlement procedures.178
B. Changed Circumstances and the TRIPS Waiver
This context leads to the current debate over patents and global access to
COVID-19 vaccines. As noted, many observers view patents as constraining access
to vaccines and other technologies valuable for fighting the pandemic. Accordingly,
in October 2020, India and South Africa proposed a waiver of certain provisions of
the TRIPS Agreement to accelerate the prevention, containment, and treatment of
COVID-19.179 Among other effects, the proposed waiver would temporarily
suspend the requirement that member states maintain minimum standards of patent
protection as provided by TRIPS. It should be noted that the proposed waiver would
merely suspend international obligations under TRIPS; states may face other
171
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international or domestic constraints against changing IP laws, or they may simply
choose to maintain existing TRIPS standards on their own accord. 180 Public health
advocates argued that temporarily waiving IP protections under TRIPS would,
among other benefits, help ramp up global production of generic versions of
patented vaccines for billions of people.181 As noted, biopharmaceutical companies
and others roundly criticized the proposed TRIPS waiver as hurting incentives to
invent and doing little to enhance vaccine availability.
To the surprise of many, in May 2021 the Biden administration announced
its support for a narrow version of the TRIPS waiver focused on COVID-19
vaccines.182 This was a remarkable sea change given that the United States had for
decades been the most vocal advocate for strong intellectual property standards
around the world. However, the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic caused a
rethinking of IP policy. As President Biden has observed about the coronavirus
pandemic in general, “We’re not going to be ultimately safe until the world is
safe.”183 Notably, in announcing this policy change, U.S. Trade Representative
Katherine Tai explicitly invoked the language of changed circumstances. She
stated, “This is a global health crisis, and the extraordinary circumstances of the
COVID-19 pandemic call for extraordinary measures. The Administration believes
strongly in intellectual property protections, but in service of ending this pandemic,
supports the waiver of these protections for COVID-19 vaccines.”184
After years of protracted negotiations, in June 2022 the WTO adopted a
limited version of the TRIPS waiver focused principally on relaxing patents on
COVID-19 vaccines.185 In so doing, the WTO also explicitly referenced the
“exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.”186 Although the long
time required to finally adopt the waiver and its narrow scope are far from ideal, it
still represents a meaningful step toward increasing global production of
vaccines.187 The new TRIPS waiver remains deeply controversial, and in the
180
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aftermath of its recent adoption, it is useful to address some of the principal
objections levied against it.
First, as noted, TRIPS already provides for compulsory licenses, thus
seemingly obviating the need for a broad-based waiver. However, the existing
compulsory license framework under TRIPS is too cumbersome and unwieldly for
the current pandemic. TRIPS creates a “product-by-product” and “country-bycountry” regime that is ill suited to address the thicket of patents covering COVID19 vaccines.188 While the TRIPS framework generally requires negotiations
between member states and individual patentees, this requirement can be waived in
times of national emergency. 189 However, even aside from negotiating with
patentees, merely identifying the patents that should be subject to individual
compulsory licenses can be very difficult. For instance, at least thirteen patent
claims cover the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, and at least twelve patent claims cover
the Moderna vaccine. 190 This problem is compounded because many of the inputs
to patented vaccines are patented themselves; issuing compulsory licenses for each
of these upstream technologies would greatly increase transaction costs. 191
Additionally, member states issuing compulsory licenses under the existing TRIPS
regime have received political blowback from wealthy countries, thus chilling their
willingness to do so.192
The existing TRIPS framework for compulsory licenses also poses
problems for countries that lack the domestic capacity to manufacture needed
technologies. The original TRIPS Agreement limited compulsory licenses “for the
supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use.” 193 This
rendered compulsory licenses unhelpful for many developing countries that lacked
the domestic capacity to manufacture a licensed invention. As discussed further
below, the WTO subsequently established a provision, TRIPS Article 31bis, that
allows a country to issue a compulsory license to export a subject technology to
another country, presumably one that does not have the capacity to manufacture it
domestically.194 Indeed, in the current pandemic, Bolivia has attempted to utilize
TRIPS Article 31bis to import Johnson & Johnson’s COVID-19 vaccine from
Biolyse Pharma, a Canadian company. 195 However, this provision is notoriously
difficult to implement, and countries have only successfully used it once in the
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decades prior to the pandemic.196 All of these considerations suggest that a broadbased IP waiver offers substantially more functionality than the existing TRIPS
framework for compulsory licenses. 197
Second, waiver critics argue that even if countries temporarily suspended
patents on COVID-19 vaccines, significant challenges of mass manufacturing
vaccines would remain. As discussed, third-party manufacturers would still lack
critical tacit knowledge.198 Additionally, shortages of raw ingredients would also
constrain production.199 There are also concerns that the TRIPS waiver will
exacerbate these shortages, as increased demand from unlicensed manufacturers
will challenge already stretched supply chains.200
However, it is important to note that barriers to widespread vaccine
production are cumulative. Although problems of tacit knowledge and raw
ingredients will remain, temporarily suspending patent rights will remove one
obstacle to widespread manufacturing. It is worth noting, moreover, that tacit
knowledge challenges are surmountable. Sophisticated vaccine manufacturing
facilities around the world possess the absorptive capacity to incorporate tacit
knowledge and manufacture vaccines.201 Additionally, although mRNA vaccines
are novel, they require fewer steps and ingredients and less physical capacity than
traditional vaccines.202 In sum, “manufacturers from Canada to Bangladesh say
they can make vaccines—they just lack patent licensing deals. When the price is
right, companies have shared secrets with new manufacturers in just months,
ramping up production and retrofitting factories.”203 More generally, resolving the
constraint of IP rights will create additional political pressure to address other
constraints, such as those related to tacit knowledge, raw ingredients, and
distribution infrastructure. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Biden administration’s
196
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support of a TRIPS waiver, advocates increased calls for vaccine developers to
transfer tacit knowledge.204
Third, some might argue that direct donations by national governments and
biopharmaceutical companies would more quickly disseminate vaccines to
developing countries than the TRIPS waiver. Certainly, governments have
enormous potential in this regard. The United States has stated its commitment to
serve as “an arsenal of vaccines for the world.” 205 As of September 2021, it had
pledged to donate 1.1 billion doses of vaccine to other countries. 206 Russia and
China are aggressively pursuing “vaccine diplomacy,” providing vaccines to other
countries—particularly developing countries—to curry favor.207 Additionally,
some biopharmaceutical firms have promoted wide access to their vaccines.
AstraZeneca, which has commercialized the University of Oxford’s vaccine, has
partnerships with the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, Gavi, and
the Serum Institute of India to provide hundreds of millions of vaccine doses.208 As
noted, Moderna has already committed to not enforcing its vaccine-related patents
during the pandemic.209 In May 2021, Pfizer and BioNTech announced they would
provide 2 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine to developing countries over the
following eighteen months.210 Pfizer added that it was offering its vaccine at
discounted prices or no profit to poorer countries.211
Addressing the coronavirus pandemic requires a multipronged approach.
Direct donations by governments and biopharmaceutical firms are an essential part
of the immediate and ongoing response, and they should continue at a robust pace.
Longer term, however, the TRIPS waiver has the capacity to vastly scale up
manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines. Currently, manufacturing of patented
vaccines, including mRNA vaccines, occurs in organizationally or contractually
delimited siloes.212 Opening access to vaccine patents—coupled with appropriate
sharing of tacit knowledge and increased production of raw ingredients—would
204
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enable massive, parallel manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines at dozens of sites
around the world. Furthermore, local manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines could
greatly assist with the logistics of distribution, particularly for mRNA vaccines,
some of which require extremely low temperatures for storage and
transportation.213
Fourth, at a more fundamental level, some criticize the TRIPS waiver on
the view that weakening patents will chill long-term incentives to invent. 214 There
are concerns that the IP waiver will imperil the continued development of COVID19 vaccines by biopharmaceutical firms that depend on IP protection to recoup
investments and turn a profit.215 More generally, the TRIPS waiver allegedly sets a
dangerous precedent, as it could chill incentives for biopharmaceutical companies
to develop vaccines for the next pandemic.216 While this is a plausible concern, it
is overstated for several reasons. Intellectual property rights are frequently
characterized as a trade-off between long-term dynamic efficiency, in the form of
strong incentives to invent, and short-term static inefficiency, in the form of
increased price and decreased access to technological goods.217 Intellectual
property law already recognizes that in some cases, the need to provide timely
access to a technological good, such as a health-related invention, warrants relaxing
strict exclusive rights. This is the basis, for instance, for expedited compulsory
licenses during public health crises,218 and a similar rationale applies to the current
pandemic.
More importantly, however, the perceived trade-off between maintaining
incentives to invent and providing wide access to essential vaccines is sometimes
illusory. As discussed above, public entities provided massive funding for research
and development leading to patented COVID-19 vaccines. They also made
enormous advance purchase commitments that mitigated risk for vaccine
developers.219 Public funding satisfied much of the incentive to invent COVID-19
vaccines, thus calling into question the need for patents to spur such innovation. As
Professor Ana Rutschman observes, “COVID-19 created a scenario in which
intellectual property scarcely played a role at the incentives level.”220 While it is
difficult to predict the future, it is likely that governments will react in a similar
fashion to future pandemics, thus ensuring a reliable incentive to invent even in the
absence of strong patent protection.
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Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the TRIPS waiver is not
tantamount to a global suspension of patent rights. The waiver simply leaves
individual states free to adjust (or not adjust) their patent laws without running afoul
of their TRIPS obligations. Due to the political clout of biopharmaceutical
companies and entrenched political values, it is likely that in most developed
countries, national governments will choose to maintain current levels of patent and
other forms of IP protection. Thus, a likely outcome of the TRIPS waiver is a
bifurcated system in which developing countries weaken certain patents and
developed countries maintain relatively strict patent protection. This could facilitate
a useful regime of price discrimination in which COVID-19 vaccines sell for
considerably more in developed countries (where governments have shown a high
willingness and ability to pay) relative to developing countries. A similar situation
pertains to HIV/AIDS medications, which are available at much higher prices in
developed versus developing countries.221 Such price discrimination helps maintain
incentives to invent while also enhancing access to such essential resources.222 For
instance, Pfizer made $36.7 billion and Moderna made $17.7 billion from their
COVID-19 vaccines in 2021,223 overwhelmingly from sales in developed countries.
It is possible for vaccine developers to make most of their profit from developed
countries while lowering prices and increasing distribution in developing countries,
thus maintaining incentives to invent while widening access to critical resources.
C. Lessons from History and a Path Forward
History provides another example where changed circumstances warranted
modifying global IP rules. In the 1990s, developing countries, particularly in subSaharan Africa, were devastated by another pandemic: HIV/AIDS. Global
biopharmaceutical companies had developed and patented effective antiretroviral
(ARV) treatments for HIV/AIDS. These ARVs were a lifeline for many people
living with HIV, but patents greatly increased their price. In their patented form,
ARVs cost about $10,000 per patient per year, but in their generic form, they cost
as little as $168 per patient per year. 224 Patent-inflated prices were out of reach for
millions of people who needed them. 225 To increase access to these essential
221
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medicines, the government of South Africa enacted legislation allowing for parallel
importation and generic manufacturing of patented ARVs.226 Subsidiaries of large
multinational pharmaceutical companies sued the South African government,
alleging among other claims that South Africa—which was a member of the
WTO—was violating its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.227 The litigation
mobilized intense opposition to patents on AIDS drugs both domestically and
globally.228 AIDS advocates argued that pharmaceutical companies were placing
profits over people’s lives and that the South African government had obligations
under international human rights law to provide wide access to essential
medicines.229 Amid significant public backlash, the pharmaceutical companies
dropped the lawsuit.230 The cessation of litigation left South Africa free to
implement its legislation to enhance access to patented medicines.231
The aftermath of the failed litigation resulted in reforms aimed at
safeguarding access to patented essential medicines.232 In 2001, the WTO
Ministerial Conference adopted the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health. Among several statements, the Doha Declaration affirmed that “[w]e
agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from
taking measures to protect public health.” 233 The Doha Declaration also
emphasized the availability of flexibilities in the TRIPS framework, and it
recognized the need to supplement the compulsory license regime for countries that
did not have the manufacturing capacity to produce patented articles for domestic
consumption.234 A few years later, the WTO adopted Article 31bis, which permits
compulsory licenses for one country to manufacture patented articles for use in
another country.235 As noted, this is the provision that Bolivia has invoked to
compulsorily license the COVID-19 vaccine manufactured by a Canadian firm.236
Perhaps more important than legal reforms, the controversy over access to
patented HIV/AIDS medicines led to behavioral changes by certain
biopharmaceutical firms. The controversy and associated public backlash helped
226

Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997 (S. Afr.).
Erika George, The Human Right to Health and HIV/AIDS: South Africa and South-South
Cooperation to Reframe Global Intellectual Property Principles and Promote Access to Essential
Medicines,18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 167, 183 (2011); ‘t Hoen et al., supra note 164, at 3.
228
George, supra note 227, at 186.
229
Id. at 184-86.
230
Id. at 186; Donald G. McNeil Jr., Drug Companies Are Focusing on the Poor After Decades of
Ignoring Them, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/health/drugspoor-countries-africa.html [hereinafter McNeil Jr., Drug Companies].
231
George, supra note 227, at 186.
232
See ‘t Hoen et al., supra note 164, at 2.
233
WORLD TRADE ORG., THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC
HEALTH, para. 4, (Nov. 14, 2001).
234
Id.
235
‘t Hoen et al., supra note 164, at 5; General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, (Sept. 1, 2003),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm; see Frederick M. Abbott &
Jerome H. Reichman, Facilitating Access to Cross-Border Supplies of Patented Pharmaceuticals:
The Case of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 535, 540 (2020) (discussing the
subsequent permanent ratification of this change).
236
See WORLD TRADE ORG., BOLIVIA, supra note 195.
227

228

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol. 17:2

motivate a cultural shift at some firms, which traditionally have been among the
most vocal advocates of strong intellectual property rights.237 In 2000, five major
drug companies announced their willingness to negotiate steep cuts in the price of
AIDS drugs in low-income countries.238 Since then, drug companies have expanded
efforts to enhance access to medicines by voluntarily reducing prices, donating
medicines, or sub-licensing patents to generic firms for distribution in developing
countries.239 Companies even compete on the Access to Medicine index, an
independent measure of pharmaceutical companies’ efforts to increase access to
medicines in poor countries.240 While formidable access gaps still remain,
biopharmaceutical companies currently sell over 400 drugs at low prices in poor
countries.241
The COVID-19 pandemic has provided another opportunity to revisit the
social contract underlying international intellectual property law. TRIPS is an
agreement that, at the broadest level, is supposed to enhance the welfare of its
members. But strict protection of patent rights on COVID-19 vaccines does not
achieve that goal, and significant changed circumstances should justify revising this
agreement. In some ways, the prospect of adopting a TRIPS waiver has already
paid dividends. For the past several years, the possibility that countries would
renegotiate the fundamental TRIPS bargain hung like a Sword of Damocles over
the heads of biopharmaceutical patentees. The desire to forestall a TRIPS waiver
likely induced voluntary behavior to increase vaccine access, thus achieving some
of the goals of the waiver before its adoption. For example, during negotiations
over the proposed waiver, Pfizer committed to sell 500 million doses of its vaccine
at a not-for-profit price to the federal government for donation overseas. 242 In
similar fashion, in the early 2000s, some suspected drug companies of voluntarily
lowering prices on AIDS treatments to prevent developing countries from taking
more drastic measures to circumvent their patents.243
While it took too long to adopt and is overly narrow, the TRIPS waiver
represents an incremental step in the right direction. More broadly, it illustrates the
principle that changed circumstances can justify modifying the social contract
undergirding international intellectual property law. Hopefully, this waiver will
galvanize additional political momentum to tackle remaining technical, material,
and infrastructural barriers to vaccine access. Relatedly, WTO members should
extend the waiver to other fields of intellectual property, such as trade secrets, and
other critical technologies necessary to fight the pandemic, such as diagnostics and
therapeutics. In this fashion, additional modifications to the social contract
237
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governing international intellectual property law can further increase access to
lifesaving technologies.
CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has been devastating in many ways, but amid
great loss there have been rays of hope. Through massive public investment and
private initiative, biopharmaceutical companies developed safe and effective
COVID-19 vaccines in record time. These companies have also patented these
vaccines, which has contributed to significant controversy over access to these
essential technologies. This controversy has been particularly acute on the global
stage given dramatically unequal access to COVID-19 vaccines in developed
versus developing countries. While the debate over access to patented vaccines has
been framed in the language of intellectual property, this Article has suggested
several ways in which contract principles can help widen access to these critical
resources.
First, this Article has explored a consideration-based model of patent
governance. For several decades, and particularly since the outbreak of the
pandemic, national governments have massively subsidized the development of
privately patented vaccines. Such consideration provides governments with
significant leverage to demand greater access to essential technologies that they
helped fund.
Second, this Article has used the concept of the quid pro quo to question the
amount of technical disclosure that patentees currently provide. The patent system
is often conceptualized as a grand societal bargain in which inventors disclose their
technologies in exchange for exclusive rights. However, there is reason to doubt
the sufficiency of the current quid pro quo when biopharmaceutical firms receive
exclusive rights yet do not disclose enough information to allow technical artisans
to make and use their patented technologies in a practically relevant sense.
Accordingly, this Article has argued for enhancing the disclosure obligations for
obtaining and maintaining a patent. Augmenting this approach, it has also suggested
leveraging the quid pro quo of public research funding to compel private
innovators—including patentees—to share tacit knowledge regarding how to make
publicly funded technologies.
Finally, turning to the grand bargain underlying international patent law,
this Article has argued that the principle of changed circumstances helps justify
temporarily waiving prevailing IP obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. History
provides a guide for relaxing intellectual property protection based on changed
circumstances. Such lessons apply with great force to the present pandemic, and
further modifications to international intellectual property law are warranted. From
federal funding to the patent system to international agreements governing
intellectual property, innovation is bound up in broad social contracts aimed at
enhancing public welfare. Through the push and pull of contract mechanisms,
innovation systems can better serve the interests of billions of people, and
collectively we can bring this pandemic to a swift end.

